Here's my paper on Latin America's issues with oligarchy. It was suggested for publishing in a journal by my professor, which was wildly unexpected since I put it together the night before it was due. The point is that it's good and clearly informative, so enjoy!
Latin America is a region full of examples of oligarchy. Each country in the region has, in some way, been touched by the unfortunate hand of oligarchy. Today, many countries in the region still wrangle with the legacies that oligarchies have left (Haiphong, 2016). Some are in the unfortunate predicament of being under a current rule by oligarchy. Others are taking turns so drastic to avoid the oligarchy that they see in their neighbouring countries, or in their own histories, that they are on the path to landing in the same, if not worse, situations (Hernandez, n.d.) The region is consistently existing in a state of either transition and reform, or a system that benefits a very small chunk of the people. This has resulted in Latin America holding itself back from full democratization. Instead, Latin America is a place where oligarchy and its legacies dominate the political, social, and economic landscape. (Sorj, 2012) This paper will discuss some modern Latin American oligarchic models, their roots, and how they affect democratization in the region. Today’s oligarchies are started mostly through big business, military or populism, and they cause significant detriments -most notably, an inefficiency to democratize- which take shape through inequality, corruption, restrictions on freedoms and liberties, uneven enforcement of rule of law, and a general lack of stability, causing Latin America to be the lagging continent when it comes to democracy.
Before I begin extensive example-based argumentation on why and how this is the case, it is important to fully comprehend all of the relevant terminology that will be repeatedly mentioned.
Democratization is not easily defined. Even the most thorough definition would likely be contention and arguable. However, for the purposes of this paper, democratization is the act of bringing about democracy to a place where in currently does not exist. Democracy, on the other hand, is not simply the rule by the people, as its Greek name would suggest. In fact, democracy is the intertwined system of an electoral regime, a liberal society and a form of governance (Dahl, 1972). According to Linz and Stepan (1996), in a democracy, political and civil rights must be guaranteed to all and equally protected. However, contrary to the common belief that democracy is simply the act of holding free and fair elections, which are truly competitive and transparent, democracy actually entails much more (Dahl, 1972). This is because holding elections that fit those criteria still provides no guarantee that the rights Linz and Stepan discuss are effectively being upheld. Who is to uphold those rights in the first place, though? Quite obviously, the state itself. Thus, democracy cannot exist without an effective state. In order to be effective, that state must have adequate control over its own territory, a good economic capacity and competence in its necessary bureaucracy (Przeworski, 2004). These factors make it possible for citizens to exercise their civic rights and duties easily. Therefore, democracy is a combination of a method of elections, a strong state that is capable of governing effectively, and a civic body that believes in democratic values through a protection of their rights (Linz and Stepan, 1996). In other words, all those at the age of majority need to have the ability to partake in free and fair elections, but they also must have the right to freedom of expression, unbiased education, equity of opportunities, and even enforcement of the rule of law, to start.
The second important term is, of course, oligarchy. In its simplest and most basic form, oligarchy is the rule of the few, for their own benefit. This is, after all, how Aristotle himself defined it. Since the Ancient Greek times, however, oligarchy has certainly evolved and morphed, making it more difficult to predict, spot, and combat. No longer is it just a matter of who controls the politics in government, oligarchy today can be far more latent. Its influences can extend to realms like education, economy, business, military and government with the only connecting factor being the control by the few for themselves (Chernenko, 2018.) A theoretical example of oligarchy would be a board of large corporation, which is based in the country, owning the largest relative proportion of private land in the country. Then, attaining and maintaining enough political power that they can sway government-enacted policies to favor them and their desires, while also controlling multiple state-owned entities and actively coordinating those entities to work in favorable harmony with their own businesses (Chernenko, 2018).
The main separation between democracy and oligarchy, according to Foweraker (2007), is that democracy seeks to promote accountability and transparency in the state, while simultaneously promoting equality and inclusivity among the citizens, whereas oligarchy specifically seeks to make politics exclusionary, while simultaneously seeking immunity from the rule of law implemented by the state.
Oligarchy is a very important part of any nation-state’s socio-political makeup. It can contribute to shaping the entire trajectory of a country’s path to democracy, prosperity, equity, among other things. A country that used to be ruled under an oligarchic system is likely to have degraded institutions, which make it difficult for it to operate under a more democratic system (Haiphong, 2016). A country which currently suffers under oligarchy would have a difficult time eliminating that oligarchy because it would be so well-implanted into every facet of the society and government. And, a country that specifically advocates for a non-oligarchical approach and does so under a populist movement scheme, as so many Latin American countries tend to, usually ends up setting up a wholly new oligarchic structure (Cammack, 2000). Thus, Latin America, as it exists today, shaped by a combination of historical, cultural and social factors, is completely pervious to oligarchy (Garcia, 2017). In this region of the world, inequality is the highest because the richest 10% of the population owns 70% of all of the wealth (Rodriguez, 2016). In fact, even in Chile, a country that is considered by international watchdogs to be one of the best democracies in the region, the average wealth gap between the poorest 10% and the richest 10% is 25 times (Corrigan & Gaviria, 2016).
Latin America has always suffered from a democratic deficit of some sort because the states have rarely been effective. Be it an inability to enforce the rule of law, an inability to redistribute wealth, or an inability to monopolize the use of control and force within their territory (Garcia, 2017). This is thanks to oligarchic politics in a number of ways. Since the colonial times in Latin America, oligarchy has had influence largely because of its relationship with international economic markets. Elites were elites because they owned land on which there were raw materials, which were essential to the subsistence of Latin American economies (Gilbert, 2017). In the 1980s, things got even worse when neoliberal reforms began to take shape (Roberts, 1995). The state-owned enterprises began becoming privatized, with their new owners usually being already-wealthy business groups (Jilberto, 2000).
In terms of the implementation of democracy, some progress was made under neoliberalism by having the conventional oligarchies in the region agree to a formal democracy under certain conditions. These conditions made it so that the oligarchies still had a strong voice in politics and so that they still had plenty of access to the state and its institutions (Foweraker & Krznaric, 2002). One example of this happened in Chile, where the constitution was amended to guarantee oligarchies and military officials’ representation and voice in the Congress (Foweraker & Krznaric, 2002). This was a major problem in the step of formalizing democratic practices. At this point, even though somewhat free and fair elections existed, government and its institutions still remained deeply inclined to side with interests of oligarchies (Klaren, 1998).
As a result of this, oligarchies’ influences began to protrude to other facets of formal democracy, including legislatures, political parties and other governmental bodies (Pavlakovic, 2013). Since the majority of governments in Latin America operate on a presidential form, it is usually imperative for presidents to gain the supports of congress and related legislative bodies to have efficient and effective presidencies. Due to oligarchic presences in those legislative bodies, however, it is extremely difficult for a president to have an effective presidency without the support of oligarchic figures (Garcia, 2017). Presidents who themselves do not have strong enough backings in politics, and are hesitant of appeasing oligarchic figures to some extent are at risk of being removed from their elected posts (Garcia, 2017). An example of this can be seen in Paraguay in 2012, as described by Jatoba & Luciano (2018):
When president Fernando Lugo was elected in 2008, he did not have a strong congressional majority. His campaign had promised very leftist ideals, including massive reforms to agriculture. Naturally, the oligarchs in Paraguay, who had controlled the vast majority of the land Lugo threatened to make reforms to, felt threatened by this. A series of disputes over farm land occurred between farmers and police, which resulted in 17 casualties. Lugo ordered the investigation of the occurrences, and was impeached and deposed 2 days later, in a move that both international watchdogs and other Latin countries described to be a de-facto coup by parliament. In an expression of outrage, Paraguay was suspended from both Mercosur and Unasur. Further evidence that the public was opposed to Lugo’s deposition is provided by the note that Lugo ran for a seat in the Senate just one year after his deposition and was easily elected.
Another example of oligarchic tendencies interfering with political democracy occurred in Venezuela in 2002, when Presdient Hugo Chavez was removed from office for 2 days in an attempted coup d’état (Wilson, 2002). Unlike Lugo, Chavez had very large popular support and a number of loyalists within the military. When his temporary successor, Pedro Carmona, declared the 1999 constitution void, and began undoing many of Chavez’s popular reforms, the public was angered. That, coupled with news beginning to spread that Chavez had not actually resigned as had been initially reported, led to an uprising that surrounded the Miraflores and reinstated the Chavez regime (Wilson, 2002).
These events in Paraguay and Venezuela serve as an example of how much power the oligarchies genuinely do wield in Latin America. Moreover, they prove that it is beneficial for presidents to establish relations with oligarchs in their countries in order to ensure their regimes peaceful and stable survival. Presidents who choose not to appease oligarchs can expect very drastic measures to face them. However, these presidents can also pursue more popular, inclusive, and open political plans because they can be focused on enforcing the will of the people, instead of the will of the elite (Hagopian, 1996).
As the example of Paraguay would imply, easily giving in to the will of oligarchs usually means that wealth redistribution policies, including progressive taxation and agriculture reform, are not going to be implemented. This is a troublesome conclusion for two major reasons. Firstly, as previously mentioned, Latin America has the highest levels of inequality in the world. Secondly, Latin American countries also have some of the lowest fiscal capacities (Rodriguez, 2016). Most economic programs therefore exclude, or detriment, the lower and middle classes. Taxation in the general geographic region is a good example of this, particularly because the lower and middle classes pay a higher proportion of their income as tax. When looked at statistically, those in the wealthiest 10% spend only 5.5% of their income on taxes (Rodriguez, 2016). This statistic does not even take into account that oligarchs generally use their political power to encourage lenient taxing policies, which make it easy for them to receive tax breaks, or evade paying taxes altogether. Moreover, most of Latin America operates on a regressive (as opposed to progressive) taxation model (Rodriguez, 2016). It is easiest to see how greatly Latin America’s inefficient wealth distribution model contributes to a further widening between the rich and poor, when one considers that, in the thirteen years between 2002 and 2015, the millionaires of Latin America managed to grow their wealth 6 times quicker than the average GDP grew in the region (Rodriguez, 2016). This is proof of economic oligarchic practices.
The major detriment caused by this ineffective wealth redistribution is that it -to some extent- incapacitates the state from creating the proper economic (and social) conditions to foster the protection of political, economic and civic rights to the general populace (Mendez et al., 1999). This, in turn, makes it difficult for a state to be democratic.
This lack of democracy is most apparent in Latin America when one considers the minimal efficiency of the state in ensuring individual rights and rule of law to the common people. Oligarchies in Latin America almost systematically commit wrong-doings against those in less-powerful positions, and the government does little to stop them (Mendez et al., 1999). Often, the government turns a blind eye to things like coercive labour or even slavery if an oligarch can promise them legislative votes or aid. These phenomena are what O’Donnell (1999) refers to as “brown areas”. Brown area existence is perpetuated by the friendly relationship between the state and oligarchs. Brazil is one example of this. There, coalition governments, particularly large ones, have efficiently passed legislation. However, they have also unfortunately contributed in large part to the diminishing of accountability and transparency watchdogs, most notably internal ones, like congressional investigative committees. The laws and policies that were effectively and efficiently passed were largely those that benefited oligarchs in some way, especially ones that eased restrictions and lowered costs for labour and material goods (Montero, 2014). This is a good example of oligarchic tendencies, when it comes to the rule of law.
This aspect contributes to the further degradation of civic rights in Latin America, which, as previously mentioned, is essential to democracy. More importantly, it creates a sense that political happenings are skewed from the beginning, which discourages participation in the civic body (Sorj, 2012). Since the politics do not seem to be inclusive, and it becomes evident that only policies benefitting the elite are passed, the average person is less-inclined to even attempt to contribute to the political landscape.
Those are some examples of how oligarchies are involved in politics and the rule of law through the proverbial “backdoor”, but sometimes, Latin American oligarchies take far more bold actions to achieve their desires. Some have even called themselves champions of democracy to defend their influences, decisions, and money (Foweraker & Krznaric, 2002). In particular, oligarchs have repeatedly mentioned that private property is a vital component of democracy, thereby making them as landowners vital to democracy. Although many would agree that private property and capitalism are interlocked with democracy, in Latin America, this argument has helped the wealthy stay wealthy, and avoid having to redistribute their wealth (Foweraker, 2007).
In Bolivia, elites in the natural gas sector conducted numerous protests against Evo Morales’ government, which posed a threat to the elites’ wealth. Here, the oligarchs went so far as to push for separatism from the poorer and more indigenous regions (Garcia, 2017). Again, they claimed themselves to be champions of democracy by disguising their moves as a push for minority rights. What these actions indicate, from an international perspective, is that the fundamental democratic institutions in Latin America, including legislatures and courts, are servile to oligarchs, and thus untrustworthy (O’Donnell, 1999). The attitude from a domestic perspective, though, is even worse. This is evident when it is noted that, in 2016, surveyed Latin Americans reached their lowest satisfaction with democracy level in years. In the same survey, about 80% of Latin Americans stated that they believed that their governments’ actions were primarily to serve the elite because they were influenced by the elite (Latinobarometro, 2016).
Unfortunately, the go-to response to oligarchy in Latin America tends to be populism (Levitsky & Loxton, 2013). Populism seems to rise when political institutions fail to please the majority (Foweraker, 2007). The political exclusion that had taken place prior to the rise of the populist allows him/her to create a narrative that pits the people against the elite. To maintain their narrative, populists tend to avoid speaking with oligarchs because they prefer to demonstrate that they represent solely the masses (Levitsky & Loxton, 2013). The issue with populism in its early stages is that leaders often execute a number of big policies or legislations, and sometimes even change constitutions. To achieve quick and visible change, though, they usually avoid going conventional routes and thereby avoid checks and balances, as well as ignore the rule of law (Roberts, 1995). However, not all of the quick-fixes implemented are truly for the people; some are for the populist leader himself. Examples of such actions include legalizing re-election, or extending presidential terms, both under a guise of it being the peoples’ will. These actions can quickly create the grounds for the creation of a new oligarchy, and in the case of Hugo Chavez, and Peru’s Alberto Fujimori, that largely did happen (Eller, 2003; Lowenthal & Jaquette, 2018).
This is an interesting paradox that shows that populist politics usually end up being oligarchic. In Chavez’s case, legislations were created and implemented without any form of checks and balances. Due to this, governmental corruption was proliferated (Mansilla, 2016). Also similarly to oligarchic regimes, Chavez’s rule saw the punishment of dissidents as commonplace (Mansilla, 2016). Though Venezuela was a relatively rich country during Chavez’s rule (thanks to its oil resources), the people did not live in matching conditions because of the massive corruption. The legacy of the Chavez regime has left Venezuelans in a terrible situation today, with many fleeing their homeland because of food shortages, poor public services, lack of accessible housing, and so on (Mansilla, 2016). With Venezuela as an example, it is easy to see that what starts as populism, usually morphs to oligarchy, and that leaves the very masses that looked to populism as their salvation in an equally bad, if not worse, predicament. Furthermore, what populism often leaves as its legacy is a polarized nation, and fewer checks and balances for successors. Despite history proving that populism is not the answer, populism continues to flourish in Latin America because the large class divide continues to flourish, too.
All this negativity in the politics of Latin America, begs the question of “Will things ever get better?” Perhaps. With the rise of social media, Latin Americans are now better informed than ever before. They are more easily able to discern potential abuses by governments or oligarchies (Garcia, 2017). Resultantly, social media also provides them with an effective platform for having their voices heard, and for creating or calling for changes (Garcia, 2017). One excellent example of this comes from Mexico, where a citizens’ initiative called “Ley-3-de-3” recently amassed well over half a million signatures, thanks to social media. Ley-3-de-3 was created in direct response to rampant corruption and requests that all civil servants be required to publicly disclose their tax returns, conflicts of interest and other assets (Montes, 2016).
Guatemala is an example of how drastic social media’s effects can be. After social media initiated protests, congress eliminated corrupt president, Otto Perez Molina’s, immunity (Valenzuela et al., 2016). Likewise, social media initiatives mobilized the protests that took place prior to the former President of Brazil, Dilma Rousseff’s, impeachment. Similar protests have resulted in anti-corruption watchdogs being created in El Salvador and Honduras (Valenzuela et al., 2016).
Oligarchies stem from weak states. This is undoubted. Therefore, it is easy to see that free and fair elections are not the only catalyst to democracy. A strong state, with strong institutions, and most importantly, a strong, politically-engaged civic body is necessary to facilitate democracy (Dahl, 1972). Though it may initially seem as though the best route to stopping oligarchy is populism, this has been historically disproven.
Oligarchy affects wealth distribution, access to objective education, freedom of thought and speech, levels of corruption, and stability and peace, amongst other things. These things are the fundamental building blocks of a society and of a government (Dahl, 1972). Since equity is one of the driving factors to democracy, a democratic country cannot truly exist without a somewhat even wealth distribution, but in a region like Latin America, wealth distribution is completely skewed towards the few richest folks. Likewise, repressive government actions to stop free speech and protest in Latin America lead to the degradation of individual rights (Sorj, 2012).
The most notable aspects of an oligarchy are the levels of corruption and the lack of enforcement of the rule of law (Mendez et al., 1999). These structures lead to an unequitable society, which sets itself up for turbulence in the future. Moreover, these aspects make a society susceptible to populism (Cammack, 2000). A society that has become disenchanted with their own economic prospects, and has realized that the laws are consistently being changed to benefit the few, while being non-evenly enforced, is likely to seek retribution in the form of voting in a government which largely opposes the status quo, and promises to voice the will of the people (Cammack, 2000).
Oligarchy has plagued Latin America from its beginnings. If the people cannot entrench their civic rights and duties more thoroughly, and if the government cannot build a stronger state, it is likely that oligarchies will perpetuate themselves eternally, and Latin America will never become fully democratized. But, if any lesson can be learnt from the recent events in Latin America, it is that a civic body, which is given the proper instruments, can bring about the change they want to see in their country. This method is far more likely to create meaningful and sustainable positive change for a region that has, for so long, been in turmoil.
Latin America is a region full of examples of oligarchy. Each country in the region has, in some way, been touched by the unfortunate hand of oligarchy. Today, many countries in the region still wrangle with the legacies that oligarchies have left (Haiphong, 2016). Some are in the unfortunate predicament of being under a current rule by oligarchy. Others are taking turns so drastic to avoid the oligarchy that they see in their neighbouring countries, or in their own histories, that they are on the path to landing in the same, if not worse, situations (Hernandez, n.d.) The region is consistently existing in a state of either transition and reform, or a system that benefits a very small chunk of the people. This has resulted in Latin America holding itself back from full democratization. Instead, Latin America is a place where oligarchy and its legacies dominate the political, social, and economic landscape. (Sorj, 2012) This paper will discuss some modern Latin American oligarchic models, their roots, and how they affect democratization in the region. Today’s oligarchies are started mostly through big business, military or populism, and they cause significant detriments -most notably, an inefficiency to democratize- which take shape through inequality, corruption, restrictions on freedoms and liberties, uneven enforcement of rule of law, and a general lack of stability, causing Latin America to be the lagging continent when it comes to democracy.
Before I begin extensive example-based argumentation on why and how this is the case, it is important to fully comprehend all of the relevant terminology that will be repeatedly mentioned.
Democratization is not easily defined. Even the most thorough definition would likely be contention and arguable. However, for the purposes of this paper, democratization is the act of bringing about democracy to a place where in currently does not exist. Democracy, on the other hand, is not simply the rule by the people, as its Greek name would suggest. In fact, democracy is the intertwined system of an electoral regime, a liberal society and a form of governance (Dahl, 1972). According to Linz and Stepan (1996), in a democracy, political and civil rights must be guaranteed to all and equally protected. However, contrary to the common belief that democracy is simply the act of holding free and fair elections, which are truly competitive and transparent, democracy actually entails much more (Dahl, 1972). This is because holding elections that fit those criteria still provides no guarantee that the rights Linz and Stepan discuss are effectively being upheld. Who is to uphold those rights in the first place, though? Quite obviously, the state itself. Thus, democracy cannot exist without an effective state. In order to be effective, that state must have adequate control over its own territory, a good economic capacity and competence in its necessary bureaucracy (Przeworski, 2004). These factors make it possible for citizens to exercise their civic rights and duties easily. Therefore, democracy is a combination of a method of elections, a strong state that is capable of governing effectively, and a civic body that believes in democratic values through a protection of their rights (Linz and Stepan, 1996). In other words, all those at the age of majority need to have the ability to partake in free and fair elections, but they also must have the right to freedom of expression, unbiased education, equity of opportunities, and even enforcement of the rule of law, to start.
The second important term is, of course, oligarchy. In its simplest and most basic form, oligarchy is the rule of the few, for their own benefit. This is, after all, how Aristotle himself defined it. Since the Ancient Greek times, however, oligarchy has certainly evolved and morphed, making it more difficult to predict, spot, and combat. No longer is it just a matter of who controls the politics in government, oligarchy today can be far more latent. Its influences can extend to realms like education, economy, business, military and government with the only connecting factor being the control by the few for themselves (Chernenko, 2018.) A theoretical example of oligarchy would be a board of large corporation, which is based in the country, owning the largest relative proportion of private land in the country. Then, attaining and maintaining enough political power that they can sway government-enacted policies to favor them and their desires, while also controlling multiple state-owned entities and actively coordinating those entities to work in favorable harmony with their own businesses (Chernenko, 2018).
The main separation between democracy and oligarchy, according to Foweraker (2007), is that democracy seeks to promote accountability and transparency in the state, while simultaneously promoting equality and inclusivity among the citizens, whereas oligarchy specifically seeks to make politics exclusionary, while simultaneously seeking immunity from the rule of law implemented by the state.
Oligarchy is a very important part of any nation-state’s socio-political makeup. It can contribute to shaping the entire trajectory of a country’s path to democracy, prosperity, equity, among other things. A country that used to be ruled under an oligarchic system is likely to have degraded institutions, which make it difficult for it to operate under a more democratic system (Haiphong, 2016). A country which currently suffers under oligarchy would have a difficult time eliminating that oligarchy because it would be so well-implanted into every facet of the society and government. And, a country that specifically advocates for a non-oligarchical approach and does so under a populist movement scheme, as so many Latin American countries tend to, usually ends up setting up a wholly new oligarchic structure (Cammack, 2000). Thus, Latin America, as it exists today, shaped by a combination of historical, cultural and social factors, is completely pervious to oligarchy (Garcia, 2017). In this region of the world, inequality is the highest because the richest 10% of the population owns 70% of all of the wealth (Rodriguez, 2016). In fact, even in Chile, a country that is considered by international watchdogs to be one of the best democracies in the region, the average wealth gap between the poorest 10% and the richest 10% is 25 times (Corrigan & Gaviria, 2016).
Latin America has always suffered from a democratic deficit of some sort because the states have rarely been effective. Be it an inability to enforce the rule of law, an inability to redistribute wealth, or an inability to monopolize the use of control and force within their territory (Garcia, 2017). This is thanks to oligarchic politics in a number of ways. Since the colonial times in Latin America, oligarchy has had influence largely because of its relationship with international economic markets. Elites were elites because they owned land on which there were raw materials, which were essential to the subsistence of Latin American economies (Gilbert, 2017). In the 1980s, things got even worse when neoliberal reforms began to take shape (Roberts, 1995). The state-owned enterprises began becoming privatized, with their new owners usually being already-wealthy business groups (Jilberto, 2000).
In terms of the implementation of democracy, some progress was made under neoliberalism by having the conventional oligarchies in the region agree to a formal democracy under certain conditions. These conditions made it so that the oligarchies still had a strong voice in politics and so that they still had plenty of access to the state and its institutions (Foweraker & Krznaric, 2002). One example of this happened in Chile, where the constitution was amended to guarantee oligarchies and military officials’ representation and voice in the Congress (Foweraker & Krznaric, 2002). This was a major problem in the step of formalizing democratic practices. At this point, even though somewhat free and fair elections existed, government and its institutions still remained deeply inclined to side with interests of oligarchies (Klaren, 1998).
As a result of this, oligarchies’ influences began to protrude to other facets of formal democracy, including legislatures, political parties and other governmental bodies (Pavlakovic, 2013). Since the majority of governments in Latin America operate on a presidential form, it is usually imperative for presidents to gain the supports of congress and related legislative bodies to have efficient and effective presidencies. Due to oligarchic presences in those legislative bodies, however, it is extremely difficult for a president to have an effective presidency without the support of oligarchic figures (Garcia, 2017). Presidents who themselves do not have strong enough backings in politics, and are hesitant of appeasing oligarchic figures to some extent are at risk of being removed from their elected posts (Garcia, 2017). An example of this can be seen in Paraguay in 2012, as described by Jatoba & Luciano (2018):
When president Fernando Lugo was elected in 2008, he did not have a strong congressional majority. His campaign had promised very leftist ideals, including massive reforms to agriculture. Naturally, the oligarchs in Paraguay, who had controlled the vast majority of the land Lugo threatened to make reforms to, felt threatened by this. A series of disputes over farm land occurred between farmers and police, which resulted in 17 casualties. Lugo ordered the investigation of the occurrences, and was impeached and deposed 2 days later, in a move that both international watchdogs and other Latin countries described to be a de-facto coup by parliament. In an expression of outrage, Paraguay was suspended from both Mercosur and Unasur. Further evidence that the public was opposed to Lugo’s deposition is provided by the note that Lugo ran for a seat in the Senate just one year after his deposition and was easily elected.
Another example of oligarchic tendencies interfering with political democracy occurred in Venezuela in 2002, when Presdient Hugo Chavez was removed from office for 2 days in an attempted coup d’état (Wilson, 2002). Unlike Lugo, Chavez had very large popular support and a number of loyalists within the military. When his temporary successor, Pedro Carmona, declared the 1999 constitution void, and began undoing many of Chavez’s popular reforms, the public was angered. That, coupled with news beginning to spread that Chavez had not actually resigned as had been initially reported, led to an uprising that surrounded the Miraflores and reinstated the Chavez regime (Wilson, 2002).
These events in Paraguay and Venezuela serve as an example of how much power the oligarchies genuinely do wield in Latin America. Moreover, they prove that it is beneficial for presidents to establish relations with oligarchs in their countries in order to ensure their regimes peaceful and stable survival. Presidents who choose not to appease oligarchs can expect very drastic measures to face them. However, these presidents can also pursue more popular, inclusive, and open political plans because they can be focused on enforcing the will of the people, instead of the will of the elite (Hagopian, 1996).
As the example of Paraguay would imply, easily giving in to the will of oligarchs usually means that wealth redistribution policies, including progressive taxation and agriculture reform, are not going to be implemented. This is a troublesome conclusion for two major reasons. Firstly, as previously mentioned, Latin America has the highest levels of inequality in the world. Secondly, Latin American countries also have some of the lowest fiscal capacities (Rodriguez, 2016). Most economic programs therefore exclude, or detriment, the lower and middle classes. Taxation in the general geographic region is a good example of this, particularly because the lower and middle classes pay a higher proportion of their income as tax. When looked at statistically, those in the wealthiest 10% spend only 5.5% of their income on taxes (Rodriguez, 2016). This statistic does not even take into account that oligarchs generally use their political power to encourage lenient taxing policies, which make it easy for them to receive tax breaks, or evade paying taxes altogether. Moreover, most of Latin America operates on a regressive (as opposed to progressive) taxation model (Rodriguez, 2016). It is easiest to see how greatly Latin America’s inefficient wealth distribution model contributes to a further widening between the rich and poor, when one considers that, in the thirteen years between 2002 and 2015, the millionaires of Latin America managed to grow their wealth 6 times quicker than the average GDP grew in the region (Rodriguez, 2016). This is proof of economic oligarchic practices.
The major detriment caused by this ineffective wealth redistribution is that it -to some extent- incapacitates the state from creating the proper economic (and social) conditions to foster the protection of political, economic and civic rights to the general populace (Mendez et al., 1999). This, in turn, makes it difficult for a state to be democratic.
This lack of democracy is most apparent in Latin America when one considers the minimal efficiency of the state in ensuring individual rights and rule of law to the common people. Oligarchies in Latin America almost systematically commit wrong-doings against those in less-powerful positions, and the government does little to stop them (Mendez et al., 1999). Often, the government turns a blind eye to things like coercive labour or even slavery if an oligarch can promise them legislative votes or aid. These phenomena are what O’Donnell (1999) refers to as “brown areas”. Brown area existence is perpetuated by the friendly relationship between the state and oligarchs. Brazil is one example of this. There, coalition governments, particularly large ones, have efficiently passed legislation. However, they have also unfortunately contributed in large part to the diminishing of accountability and transparency watchdogs, most notably internal ones, like congressional investigative committees. The laws and policies that were effectively and efficiently passed were largely those that benefited oligarchs in some way, especially ones that eased restrictions and lowered costs for labour and material goods (Montero, 2014). This is a good example of oligarchic tendencies, when it comes to the rule of law.
This aspect contributes to the further degradation of civic rights in Latin America, which, as previously mentioned, is essential to democracy. More importantly, it creates a sense that political happenings are skewed from the beginning, which discourages participation in the civic body (Sorj, 2012). Since the politics do not seem to be inclusive, and it becomes evident that only policies benefitting the elite are passed, the average person is less-inclined to even attempt to contribute to the political landscape.
Those are some examples of how oligarchies are involved in politics and the rule of law through the proverbial “backdoor”, but sometimes, Latin American oligarchies take far more bold actions to achieve their desires. Some have even called themselves champions of democracy to defend their influences, decisions, and money (Foweraker & Krznaric, 2002). In particular, oligarchs have repeatedly mentioned that private property is a vital component of democracy, thereby making them as landowners vital to democracy. Although many would agree that private property and capitalism are interlocked with democracy, in Latin America, this argument has helped the wealthy stay wealthy, and avoid having to redistribute their wealth (Foweraker, 2007).
In Bolivia, elites in the natural gas sector conducted numerous protests against Evo Morales’ government, which posed a threat to the elites’ wealth. Here, the oligarchs went so far as to push for separatism from the poorer and more indigenous regions (Garcia, 2017). Again, they claimed themselves to be champions of democracy by disguising their moves as a push for minority rights. What these actions indicate, from an international perspective, is that the fundamental democratic institutions in Latin America, including legislatures and courts, are servile to oligarchs, and thus untrustworthy (O’Donnell, 1999). The attitude from a domestic perspective, though, is even worse. This is evident when it is noted that, in 2016, surveyed Latin Americans reached their lowest satisfaction with democracy level in years. In the same survey, about 80% of Latin Americans stated that they believed that their governments’ actions were primarily to serve the elite because they were influenced by the elite (Latinobarometro, 2016).
Unfortunately, the go-to response to oligarchy in Latin America tends to be populism (Levitsky & Loxton, 2013). Populism seems to rise when political institutions fail to please the majority (Foweraker, 2007). The political exclusion that had taken place prior to the rise of the populist allows him/her to create a narrative that pits the people against the elite. To maintain their narrative, populists tend to avoid speaking with oligarchs because they prefer to demonstrate that they represent solely the masses (Levitsky & Loxton, 2013). The issue with populism in its early stages is that leaders often execute a number of big policies or legislations, and sometimes even change constitutions. To achieve quick and visible change, though, they usually avoid going conventional routes and thereby avoid checks and balances, as well as ignore the rule of law (Roberts, 1995). However, not all of the quick-fixes implemented are truly for the people; some are for the populist leader himself. Examples of such actions include legalizing re-election, or extending presidential terms, both under a guise of it being the peoples’ will. These actions can quickly create the grounds for the creation of a new oligarchy, and in the case of Hugo Chavez, and Peru’s Alberto Fujimori, that largely did happen (Eller, 2003; Lowenthal & Jaquette, 2018).
This is an interesting paradox that shows that populist politics usually end up being oligarchic. In Chavez’s case, legislations were created and implemented without any form of checks and balances. Due to this, governmental corruption was proliferated (Mansilla, 2016). Also similarly to oligarchic regimes, Chavez’s rule saw the punishment of dissidents as commonplace (Mansilla, 2016). Though Venezuela was a relatively rich country during Chavez’s rule (thanks to its oil resources), the people did not live in matching conditions because of the massive corruption. The legacy of the Chavez regime has left Venezuelans in a terrible situation today, with many fleeing their homeland because of food shortages, poor public services, lack of accessible housing, and so on (Mansilla, 2016). With Venezuela as an example, it is easy to see that what starts as populism, usually morphs to oligarchy, and that leaves the very masses that looked to populism as their salvation in an equally bad, if not worse, predicament. Furthermore, what populism often leaves as its legacy is a polarized nation, and fewer checks and balances for successors. Despite history proving that populism is not the answer, populism continues to flourish in Latin America because the large class divide continues to flourish, too.
All this negativity in the politics of Latin America, begs the question of “Will things ever get better?” Perhaps. With the rise of social media, Latin Americans are now better informed than ever before. They are more easily able to discern potential abuses by governments or oligarchies (Garcia, 2017). Resultantly, social media also provides them with an effective platform for having their voices heard, and for creating or calling for changes (Garcia, 2017). One excellent example of this comes from Mexico, where a citizens’ initiative called “Ley-3-de-3” recently amassed well over half a million signatures, thanks to social media. Ley-3-de-3 was created in direct response to rampant corruption and requests that all civil servants be required to publicly disclose their tax returns, conflicts of interest and other assets (Montes, 2016).
Guatemala is an example of how drastic social media’s effects can be. After social media initiated protests, congress eliminated corrupt president, Otto Perez Molina’s, immunity (Valenzuela et al., 2016). Likewise, social media initiatives mobilized the protests that took place prior to the former President of Brazil, Dilma Rousseff’s, impeachment. Similar protests have resulted in anti-corruption watchdogs being created in El Salvador and Honduras (Valenzuela et al., 2016).
Oligarchies stem from weak states. This is undoubted. Therefore, it is easy to see that free and fair elections are not the only catalyst to democracy. A strong state, with strong institutions, and most importantly, a strong, politically-engaged civic body is necessary to facilitate democracy (Dahl, 1972). Though it may initially seem as though the best route to stopping oligarchy is populism, this has been historically disproven.
Oligarchy affects wealth distribution, access to objective education, freedom of thought and speech, levels of corruption, and stability and peace, amongst other things. These things are the fundamental building blocks of a society and of a government (Dahl, 1972). Since equity is one of the driving factors to democracy, a democratic country cannot truly exist without a somewhat even wealth distribution, but in a region like Latin America, wealth distribution is completely skewed towards the few richest folks. Likewise, repressive government actions to stop free speech and protest in Latin America lead to the degradation of individual rights (Sorj, 2012).
The most notable aspects of an oligarchy are the levels of corruption and the lack of enforcement of the rule of law (Mendez et al., 1999). These structures lead to an unequitable society, which sets itself up for turbulence in the future. Moreover, these aspects make a society susceptible to populism (Cammack, 2000). A society that has become disenchanted with their own economic prospects, and has realized that the laws are consistently being changed to benefit the few, while being non-evenly enforced, is likely to seek retribution in the form of voting in a government which largely opposes the status quo, and promises to voice the will of the people (Cammack, 2000).
Oligarchy has plagued Latin America from its beginnings. If the people cannot entrench their civic rights and duties more thoroughly, and if the government cannot build a stronger state, it is likely that oligarchies will perpetuate themselves eternally, and Latin America will never become fully democratized. But, if any lesson can be learnt from the recent events in Latin America, it is that a civic body, which is given the proper instruments, can bring about the change they want to see in their country. This method is far more likely to create meaningful and sustainable positive change for a region that has, for so long, been in turmoil.
