Latin America’s Perpetual Oligarchy: Dealing with Political, Economic, and Populist Waves

Here's my paper on Latin America's issues with oligarchy. It was suggested for publishing in a journal by my professor, which was wildly unexpected since I put it together the night before it was due. The point is that it's good and clearly informative, so enjoy!

Latin America is a region full of examples of oligarchy. Each country in the region has, in some way, been touched by the unfortunate hand of oligarchy. Today, many countries in the region still wrangle with the legacies that oligarchies have left (Haiphong, 2016). Some are in the unfortunate predicament of being under a current rule by oligarchy. Others are taking turns so drastic to avoid the oligarchy that they see in their neighbouring countries, or in their own histories, that they are on the path to landing in the same, if not worse, situations (Hernandez, n.d.) The region is consistently existing in a state of either transition and reform, or a system that benefits a very small chunk of the people. This has resulted in Latin America holding itself back from full democratization. Instead, Latin America is a place where oligarchy and its legacies dominate the political, social, and economic landscape. (Sorj, 2012) This paper will discuss some modern Latin American oligarchic models, their roots, and how they affect democratization in the region. Today’s oligarchies are started mostly through big business, military or populism, and they cause significant detriments -most notably, an inefficiency to democratize- which take shape through inequality, corruption, restrictions on freedoms and liberties, uneven enforcement of rule of law, and a general lack of stability, causing Latin America to be the lagging continent when it comes to democracy.

Before I begin extensive example-based argumentation on why and how this is the case, it is important to fully comprehend all of the relevant terminology that will be repeatedly mentioned.

Democratization is not easily defined. Even the most thorough definition would likely be contention and arguable. However, for the purposes of this paper, democratization is the act of bringing about democracy to a place where in currently does not exist. Democracy, on the other hand, is not simply the rule by the people, as its Greek name would suggest. In fact, democracy is the intertwined system of an electoral regime, a liberal society and a form of governance (Dahl, 1972). According to Linz and Stepan (1996), in a democracy, political and civil rights must be guaranteed to all and equally protected. However, contrary to the common belief that democracy is simply the act of holding free and fair elections, which are truly competitive and transparent, democracy actually entails much more (Dahl, 1972). This is because holding elections that fit those criteria still provides no guarantee that the rights Linz and Stepan discuss are effectively being upheld. Who is to uphold those rights in the first place, though? Quite obviously, the state itself. Thus, democracy cannot exist without an effective state. In order to be effective, that state must have adequate control over its own territory, a good economic capacity and competence in its necessary bureaucracy (Przeworski, 2004). These factors make it possible for citizens to exercise their civic rights and duties easily. Therefore, democracy is a combination of a method of elections, a strong state that is capable of governing effectively, and a civic body that believes in democratic values through a protection of their rights (Linz and Stepan, 1996). In other words, all those at the age of majority need to have the ability to partake in free and fair elections, but they also must have the right to freedom of expression, unbiased education, equity of opportunities, and even enforcement of the rule of law, to start.

The second important term is, of course, oligarchy. In its simplest and most basic form, oligarchy is the rule of the few, for their own benefit. This is, after all, how Aristotle himself defined it. Since the Ancient Greek times, however, oligarchy has certainly evolved and morphed, making it more difficult to predict, spot, and combat. No longer is it just a matter of who controls the politics in government, oligarchy today can be far more latent. Its influences can extend to realms like education, economy, business, military and government with the only connecting factor being the control by the few for themselves (Chernenko, 2018.) A theoretical example of oligarchy would be a board of large corporation, which is based in the country, owning the largest relative proportion of private land in the country. Then, attaining and maintaining enough political power that they can sway government-enacted policies to favor them and their desires, while also controlling multiple state-owned entities and actively coordinating those entities to work in favorable harmony with their own businesses (Chernenko, 2018).

The main separation between democracy and oligarchy, according to Foweraker (2007), is that democracy seeks to promote accountability and transparency in the state, while simultaneously promoting equality and inclusivity among the citizens, whereas oligarchy specifically seeks to make politics exclusionary, while simultaneously seeking immunity from the rule of law implemented by the state.

Oligarchy is a very important part of any nation-state’s socio-political makeup. It can contribute to shaping the entire trajectory of a country’s path to democracy, prosperity, equity, among other things. A country that used to be ruled under an oligarchic system is likely to have degraded institutions, which make it difficult for it to operate under a more democratic system (Haiphong, 2016). A country which currently suffers under oligarchy would have a difficult time eliminating that oligarchy because it would be so well-implanted into every facet of the society and government. And, a country that specifically advocates for a non-oligarchical approach and does so under a populist movement scheme, as so many Latin American countries tend to, usually ends up setting up a wholly new oligarchic structure (Cammack, 2000). Thus, Latin America, as it exists today, shaped by a combination of historical, cultural and social factors, is completely pervious to oligarchy (Garcia, 2017). In this region of the world, inequality is the highest because the richest 10% of the population owns 70% of all of the wealth (Rodriguez, 2016). In fact, even in Chile, a country that is considered by international watchdogs to be one of the best democracies in the region, the average wealth gap between the poorest 10% and the richest 10% is 25 times (Corrigan & Gaviria, 2016).

Latin America has always suffered from a democratic deficit of some sort because the states have rarely been effective. Be it an inability to enforce the rule of law, an inability to redistribute wealth, or an inability to monopolize the use of control and force within their territory (Garcia, 2017). This is thanks to oligarchic politics in a number of ways. Since the colonial times in Latin America, oligarchy has had influence largely because of its relationship with international economic markets. Elites were elites because they owned land on which there were raw materials, which were essential to the subsistence of Latin American economies (Gilbert, 2017). In the 1980s, things got even worse when neoliberal reforms began to take shape (Roberts, 1995). The state-owned enterprises began becoming privatized, with their new owners usually being already-wealthy business groups (Jilberto, 2000).

In terms of the implementation of democracy, some progress was made under neoliberalism by having the conventional oligarchies in the region agree to a formal democracy under certain conditions. These conditions made it so that the oligarchies still had a strong voice in politics and so that they still had plenty of access to the state and its institutions (Foweraker & Krznaric, 2002). One example of this happened in Chile, where the constitution was amended to guarantee oligarchies and military officials’ representation and voice in the Congress (Foweraker & Krznaric, 2002). This was a major problem in the step of formalizing democratic practices. At this point, even though somewhat free and fair elections existed, government and its institutions still remained deeply inclined to side with interests of oligarchies (Klaren, 1998).

As a result of this, oligarchies’ influences began to protrude to other facets of formal democracy, including legislatures, political parties and other governmental bodies (Pavlakovic, 2013). Since the majority of governments in Latin America operate on a presidential form, it is usually imperative for presidents to gain the supports of congress and related legislative bodies to have efficient and effective presidencies. Due to oligarchic presences in those legislative bodies, however, it is extremely difficult for a president to have an effective presidency without the support of oligarchic figures (Garcia, 2017). Presidents who themselves do not have strong enough backings in politics, and are hesitant of appeasing oligarchic figures to some extent are at risk of being removed from their elected posts (Garcia, 2017). An example of this can be seen in Paraguay in 2012, as described by Jatoba & Luciano (2018):

When president Fernando Lugo was elected in 2008, he did not have a strong congressional majority. His campaign had promised very leftist ideals, including massive reforms to agriculture. Naturally, the oligarchs in Paraguay, who had controlled the vast majority of the land Lugo threatened to make reforms to, felt threatened by this. A series of disputes over farm land occurred between farmers and police, which resulted in 17 casualties. Lugo ordered the investigation of the occurrences, and was impeached and deposed 2 days later, in a move that both international watchdogs and other Latin countries described to be a de-facto coup by parliament. In an expression of outrage, Paraguay was suspended from both Mercosur and Unasur. Further evidence that the public was opposed to Lugo’s deposition is provided by the note that Lugo ran for a seat in the Senate just one year after his deposition and was easily elected.

Another example of oligarchic tendencies interfering with political democracy occurred in Venezuela in 2002, when Presdient Hugo Chavez was removed from office for 2 days in an attempted coup d’état (Wilson, 2002). Unlike Lugo, Chavez had very large popular support and a number of loyalists within the military. When his temporary successor, Pedro Carmona, declared the 1999 constitution void, and began undoing many of Chavez’s popular reforms, the public was angered. That, coupled with news beginning to spread that Chavez had not actually resigned as had been initially reported, led to an uprising that surrounded the Miraflores and reinstated the Chavez regime (Wilson, 2002).
These events in Paraguay and Venezuela serve as an example of how much power the oligarchies genuinely do wield in Latin America. Moreover, they prove that it is beneficial for presidents to establish relations with oligarchs in their countries in order to ensure their regimes peaceful and stable survival. Presidents who choose not to appease oligarchs can expect very drastic measures to face them. However, these presidents can also pursue more popular, inclusive, and open political plans because they can be focused on enforcing the will of the people, instead of the will of the elite (Hagopian, 1996).

As the example of Paraguay would imply, easily giving in to the will of oligarchs usually means that wealth redistribution policies, including progressive taxation and agriculture reform, are not going to be implemented. This is a troublesome conclusion for two major reasons. Firstly, as previously mentioned, Latin America has the highest levels of inequality in the world. Secondly, Latin American countries also have some of the lowest fiscal capacities (Rodriguez, 2016). Most economic programs therefore exclude, or detriment, the lower and middle classes. Taxation in the general geographic region is a good example of this, particularly because the lower and middle classes pay a higher proportion of their income as tax. When looked at statistically, those in the wealthiest 10% spend only 5.5% of their income on taxes (Rodriguez, 2016). This statistic does not even take into account that oligarchs generally use their political power to encourage lenient taxing policies, which make it easy for them to receive tax breaks, or evade paying taxes altogether. Moreover, most of Latin America operates on a regressive (as opposed to progressive) taxation model (Rodriguez, 2016). It is easiest to see how greatly Latin America’s inefficient wealth distribution model contributes to a further widening between the rich and poor, when one considers that, in the thirteen years between 2002 and 2015, the millionaires of Latin America managed to grow their wealth 6 times quicker than the average GDP grew in the region (Rodriguez, 2016). This is proof of economic oligarchic practices.

The major detriment caused by this ineffective wealth redistribution is that it -to some extent- incapacitates the state from creating the proper economic (and social) conditions to foster the protection of political, economic and civic rights to the general populace (Mendez et al., 1999). This, in turn, makes it difficult for a state to be democratic.

This lack of democracy is most apparent in Latin America when one considers the minimal efficiency of the state in ensuring individual rights and rule of law to the common people. Oligarchies in Latin America almost systematically commit wrong-doings against those in less-powerful positions, and the government does little to stop them (Mendez et al., 1999). Often, the government turns a blind eye to things like coercive labour or even slavery if an oligarch can promise them legislative votes or aid. These phenomena are what O’Donnell (1999) refers to as “brown areas”. Brown area existence is perpetuated by the friendly relationship between the state and oligarchs. Brazil is one example of this. There, coalition governments, particularly large ones, have efficiently passed legislation. However, they have also unfortunately contributed in large part to the diminishing of accountability and transparency watchdogs, most notably internal ones, like congressional investigative committees. The laws and policies that were effectively and efficiently passed were largely those that benefited oligarchs in some way, especially ones that eased restrictions and lowered costs for labour and material goods (Montero, 2014). This is a good example of oligarchic tendencies, when it comes to the rule of law.

This aspect contributes to the further degradation of civic rights in Latin America, which, as previously mentioned, is essential to democracy. More importantly, it creates a sense that political happenings are skewed from the beginning, which discourages participation in the civic body (Sorj, 2012). Since the politics do not seem to be inclusive, and it becomes evident that only policies benefitting the elite are passed, the average person is less-inclined to even attempt to contribute to the political landscape.

Those are some examples of how oligarchies are involved in politics and the rule of law through the proverbial “backdoor”, but sometimes, Latin American oligarchies take far more bold actions to achieve their desires. Some have even called themselves champions of democracy to defend their influences, decisions, and money (Foweraker & Krznaric, 2002). In particular, oligarchs have repeatedly mentioned that private property is a vital component of democracy, thereby making them as landowners vital to democracy. Although many would agree that private property and capitalism are interlocked with democracy, in Latin America, this argument has helped the wealthy stay wealthy, and avoid having to redistribute their wealth (Foweraker, 2007).

In Bolivia, elites in the natural gas sector conducted numerous protests against Evo Morales’ government, which posed a threat to the elites’ wealth. Here, the oligarchs went so far as to push for separatism from the poorer and more indigenous regions (Garcia, 2017). Again, they claimed themselves to be champions of democracy by disguising their moves as a push for minority rights. What these actions indicate, from an international perspective, is that the fundamental democratic institutions in Latin America, including legislatures and courts, are servile to oligarchs, and thus untrustworthy (O’Donnell, 1999). The attitude from a domestic perspective, though, is even worse. This is evident when it is noted that, in 2016, surveyed Latin Americans reached their lowest satisfaction with democracy level in years. In the same survey, about 80% of Latin Americans stated that they believed that their governments’ actions were primarily to serve the elite because they were influenced by the elite (Latinobarometro, 2016).

Unfortunately, the go-to response to oligarchy in Latin America tends to be populism (Levitsky & Loxton, 2013). Populism seems to rise when political institutions fail to please the majority (Foweraker, 2007). The political exclusion that had taken place prior to the rise of the populist allows him/her to create a narrative that pits the people against the elite. To maintain their narrative, populists tend to avoid speaking with oligarchs because they prefer to demonstrate that they represent solely the masses (Levitsky & Loxton, 2013). The issue with populism in its early stages is that leaders often execute a number of big policies or legislations, and sometimes even change constitutions. To achieve quick and visible change, though, they usually avoid going conventional routes and thereby avoid checks and balances, as well as ignore the rule of law (Roberts, 1995). However, not all of the quick-fixes implemented are truly for the people; some are for the populist leader himself. Examples of such actions include legalizing re-election, or extending presidential terms, both under a guise of it being the peoples’ will. These actions can quickly create the grounds for the creation of a new oligarchy, and in the case of Hugo Chavez, and Peru’s Alberto Fujimori, that largely did happen (Eller, 2003; Lowenthal & Jaquette, 2018).

This is an interesting paradox that shows that populist politics usually end up being oligarchic. In Chavez’s case, legislations were created and implemented without any form of checks and balances. Due to this, governmental corruption was proliferated (Mansilla, 2016). Also similarly to oligarchic regimes, Chavez’s rule saw the punishment of dissidents as commonplace (Mansilla, 2016). Though Venezuela was a relatively rich country during Chavez’s rule (thanks to its oil resources), the people did not live in matching conditions because of the massive corruption. The legacy of the Chavez regime has left Venezuelans in a terrible situation today, with many fleeing their homeland because of food shortages, poor public services, lack of accessible housing, and so on (Mansilla, 2016). With Venezuela as an example, it is easy to see that what starts as populism, usually morphs to oligarchy, and that leaves the very masses that looked to populism as their salvation in an equally bad, if not worse, predicament. Furthermore, what populism often leaves as its legacy is a polarized nation, and fewer checks and balances for successors. Despite history proving that populism is not the answer, populism continues to flourish in Latin America because the large class divide continues to flourish, too.

All this negativity in the politics of Latin America, begs the question of “Will things ever get better?” Perhaps. With the rise of social media, Latin Americans are now better informed than ever before. They are more easily able to discern potential abuses by governments or oligarchies (Garcia, 2017). Resultantly, social media also provides them with an effective platform for having their voices heard, and for creating or calling for changes (Garcia, 2017). One excellent example of this comes from Mexico, where a citizens’ initiative called “Ley-3-de-3” recently amassed well over half a million signatures, thanks to social media. Ley-3-de-3 was created in direct response to rampant corruption and requests that all civil servants be required to publicly disclose their tax returns, conflicts of interest and other assets (Montes, 2016).

Guatemala is an example of how drastic social media’s effects can be. After social media initiated protests, congress eliminated corrupt president, Otto Perez Molina’s, immunity (Valenzuela et al., 2016). Likewise, social media initiatives mobilized the protests that took place prior to the former President of Brazil, Dilma Rousseff’s, impeachment. Similar protests have resulted in anti-corruption watchdogs being created in El Salvador and Honduras (Valenzuela et al., 2016).

Oligarchies stem from weak states. This is undoubted. Therefore, it is easy to see that free and fair elections are not the only catalyst to democracy. A strong state, with strong institutions, and most importantly, a strong, politically-engaged civic body is necessary to facilitate democracy (Dahl, 1972). Though it may initially seem as though the best route to stopping oligarchy is populism, this has been historically disproven.

Oligarchy affects wealth distribution, access to objective education, freedom of thought and speech, levels of corruption, and stability and peace, amongst other things. These things are the fundamental building blocks of a society and of a government (Dahl, 1972). Since equity is one of the driving factors to democracy, a democratic country cannot truly exist without a somewhat even wealth distribution, but in a region like Latin America, wealth distribution is completely skewed towards the few richest folks. Likewise, repressive government actions to stop free speech and protest in Latin America lead to the degradation of individual rights (Sorj, 2012).

The most notable aspects of an oligarchy are the levels of corruption and the lack of enforcement of the rule of law (Mendez et al., 1999). These structures lead to an unequitable society, which sets itself up for turbulence in the future. Moreover, these aspects make a society susceptible to populism (Cammack, 2000). A society that has become disenchanted with their own economic prospects, and has realized that the laws are consistently being changed to benefit the few, while being non-evenly enforced, is likely to seek retribution in the form of voting in a government which largely opposes the status quo, and promises to voice the will of the people (Cammack, 2000).

Oligarchy has plagued Latin America from its beginnings. If the people cannot entrench their civic rights and duties more thoroughly, and if the government cannot build a stronger state, it is likely that oligarchies will perpetuate themselves eternally, and Latin America will never become fully democratized. But, if any lesson can be learnt from the recent events in Latin America, it is that a civic body, which is given the proper instruments, can bring about the change they want to see in their country. This method is far more likely to create meaningful and sustainable positive change for a region that has, for so long, been in turmoil.

Marxists Stick Together: Why the Chinese Communists Formed an Alliance with the Soviet Union in 1950

Lately, I’ve been re-inspired to write whiny diaries, but unlike before, I’ve decided to keep them private, in a password-protected file. Sadly, you won’t be reading about the grievances I’ve been suffering personally any time soon, but I can offer you some academic political papers on various subjects, like this one on China that scored me a near-perfect mark in a Chinese International Relations course. I hope this satisfies at least a few of you.

After the Chinese Communist Party under Mao Zedong took power in China, the country was quick to create a strategic alliance with the Soviet Union, which culminated with the signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance on the 14th of February, 1950 (Li, 2012). Out of the two major world powers at the time, the United States (US) and the Soviet Union, the Chinese government decided to actively seek a relationship with the Soviets over the Americans. Eventually, this relationship would sour and the world would see a normalizing in Sino-US relations (Blanchard, 2015). Nonetheless, why Mao Zedong’s government chose an alliance with Joseph Stalin’s is a mostly explainable phenomenon, when looked at through the lens of the International Relations theory of Shared Values.

Shared values theory explains that countries with similar political ideologies and values are likely to align with each other (Neumayer, 2008). The perception of similarity in interpretations of Marxism between the two countries, the perceived scope of difference between Chinese and US values by the Chinese, and the change in leadership, which brings with it varied political and ideological interpretations and aspirations are all potential influencers on China’s decision to ally itself with the Soviet Union in 1950. In theory, if China perceived itself as having a more similar political ideology to the Soviets, also perceived itself as having a completely incompatible ideology with the other major world power, and felt as though the leader of the Soviet Union was a reasonable and suitable interpreter of Marxism, then China would be more likely to ally itself with the Soviet Union. Moreover, in the case that China’s perceived difference from the US shrunk and its perceived difference with the USSR grew, then it would be expected that China would shift its alliance towards the US.

If this theory were true, then it would be expected that China would be allied with the Soviet Union for as long as it felt that it, and the leader at the nation’s helm, was similarly interpreting Marxism, the cornerstone political ideology of China. Likewise, the same would be observed especially if the Chinese perceived the other major world power, the US, to have a political ideology completely juxtaposed to its own, since that would create an even stronger contrast between Marxism and Capitalism. The most appropriate way to measure how ideologically various states are is to compare their official, explicit political ideologies (i.e. is the Communist party in power or not), and to seek out proof of the relevance of ideology in international interaction. 

Post World War Two, China and the USSR were both under Communist Party rule, with the former being led by Mao Zedong and the latter, Joseph Stalin. The leaders had similar, highly-restrictive readings of Marxism. In particular, their shared elimination of political dissidents and bourgeoisie emulated this (Graziosi, 2016). Mao also emulated a number of Stalin’s policies and looked up to him as a true Marxist. Most notably, Mao’s Great Leap Forward of the 1950s was based heavily off of Stalin’s Five Year Plans of the 1930s. Both plans failed and resulted in large loss of lives (Graziosi, 2016). Simultaneously, the US was in the midst of McCarthyism, a movement that was extremely hostile to any Marxist sentiments (Michaels, 2017). Moreover, Mao regarded Stalin as an effective, non-revisionist leader, and made that very clear to Stalin’s successor, Nikita Khrushchev, after Khrushchev gave his Cult of Personality speech in which he denounced Stalin. Mao is thought to have told Khrushchev that “out of Stalin’s 10 fingers, 7 were rotten”, implying that the majority of Stalin’s actions were warranted and good (Kuo, 2001). When Khrushchev began his liberalization of the Soviet Union, known colloquially as the “Khrushchev Thaw”, he freed political prisoners, eased censorship policies and began seeking peaceful coexistence with other nations, including the US. Mao saw this as not only a betrayal of the Soviet relationship with China, but also as a complete betrayal of the principles of Marxism (Bittner et al., 2008). Meanwhile, McCarthyism was dying down in the US (Michaels, 2017).

It was around this time that China’s rift with the Soviets began, and normalization of relations with the US began (Bittner et al., 2008). What this demonstrates is that the theory of Shared Values is largely adequate at explaining China’s relations with the Soviets. While similar versions of Marxism were implemented in the two countries, while the leaders had similar views and while the other power seemed too distant ideologically, the Sino-Soviet relations were good and there was reason for their alliance. Once the two countries began to view each other’s Marxism to be misconstrued, once the leaders began to look down on each other’s interpretations of Marxism, and once the other power’s ideology became less polarized, a disintegration of relations began.

Alternatively, the Sino-Soviet alliance could be explained through the Balance of Threat theory (BOT), which it similar to the Balance of Power theory, though different. It assumes that a country perceives threats from others global actors and forms alliances accordingly (Walt, 1987). Some independent variables that would affect why China would align itself with the Soviets would be perception of threat from major world actors, which would itself stem from the perceived aggregate power, offensive capabilities, and ideology of the world power in question, among other aspects. In 1950 China’s case, the US obviously seemed like a more threatening power than the Soviets, which made it understandable that the Chinese would align with the Soviets. 

Naturally, if China perceived the US to be a greater threat to it than the USSR, it would choose to align itself with the latter, assuming that states inherently desire alliances. Likewise, if threat perceptions, and the ways they are measured shift, then China would shift its alliance to the US. If this theory were true, then China would see itself aligned with the USSR until it perceived the Soviet threat to be greater than the US’s, which would stem from the perception of the Soviet’s aggregate power, offensive capabilities and political ideology. To adequately measure this, finding documents that explicitly state a perception of threat of one nation, as well as corroborating information on reasonable measures that could render a country threatening, like military capacity and ideological positioning, is key. 

Using GDP, export rates and military strength (factors that could be used to assess the threat a country poses), it is clear that in 1949, the Soviet Union was a lesser threat than the US to China. The USSR had a significantly lower GDP per capita, sitting at just over 1500$, comparable to the US’s approximately 12000$ (Maddison, 2006). The USSR was largely self-sufficient, and exported very little, compared to the US’s 8% of GDP. Moreover, 1949 was the year that the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, which China would go on to join, was founded by the Soviets to encourage particularly communist countries to not stray towards the US-offered Marshall Plan (Weiner, 1981). In the same year, the USA founded NATO, which was seen as a bolstering of their military might (Wood, 2015). Meanwhile, the USSR’s Red Army was suffering at the hands of Stalin’s military purges. All of these factors made it reasonable for China to see the USA as a bigger threat, particularly when that is combined with China’s long-lasting belief that the US is an imperialist force (Kuo, 2001). Thus, it would be reasonable to assume that China would create an alliance with the less-threatening of the two nations, so as to create some mutual support against a common enemy, whilst not giving up any autonomy, as would be expected in siding with the USA. 

The main issue with this theory is that it fails to hold up when the reasons for the Sino-Soviet rift are considered. The USA remained a seemingly bigger threat to China throughout the 1960s and 70s. Their economy and military were both stronger than the Soviets (Wood, 2015). Their political ideology also greatly differed. China’s rift with the Soviets had to have stemmed from something other than pure threat perception, unless other factors dictating threat came to the forefront of Chinese perception, making the Soviets seem more threatening. Examples of such factors could include rift in ideology, proxy wars, or geographic proximity.

Despite their flaws, the first theory, Ideological Affinity, seems to better describe the true outcomes of the Sino-Soviet and its eventual demise, since it seems to face less counter-arguments and aligns better with historical facts. 

Both theories assume that nation-states inherently want alliances with other states. Though, in China’s case, an argument could be made that because of the country’s frail post-war state, an alliance with a stronger, more-well-to-do country like the Soviet Union would be needed and obviously preferable to being isolated, it still is wrong to make a blanket assumption that any type of state prefers alliances to isolationism. Furthermore, the ideological affinities theory relies a lot of subjective evidence, which I feel is common throughout the political sciences field. This is because it is very hard to reach a non-contentious conclusion on what the proper and true implementation of a political theoretical concept, like Marxism, is. Essentially, the entire theory relies on attempting to justify perceptions. This links in with what could be claimed as the primary flaw of the second theory, which is that it assumes states -and their leaders- consistently operate in wholly rational ways, which is untrue (Duru, 2014). Granted, some states may accurately perceive and interpret threats and changes in threats. Often, however, states can sour relations with each other for irrational reasons, like personal distastes or historical memories, and then mold narratives to fit their opinions accordingly. 

Moreover, my hypotheses were both somewhat subjectively phrased, so as to fit the research findings better. If more time and writing space were allotted to this assignment, I would have phrased my hypotheses in more objective ways, and I would actively search out information about other Marxist countries international relations, as those would offer similar foundations, but possibly different outcomes in alliance-formation. Also, I would search for more varied and specific evidence. I felt quite a crunch in this paper in including plenty of evidence, while simultaneously carrying out solid critical tests.

Using the ideological affinity theory, it is evident why China chose to align with the Soviets in the 1949-1950 period. Their leaders had similar interpretations of Marxism, and even emulated each other in implementing Marxist politics sometimes. Though the threat perception theory has its merits, it is harder to argue since it fails to explain why Sino-US relations would improve despite a significant lack in change of threat level of either or the two major powers. Realistically, a single theory cannot explain broad foreign policy decisions since they are made up of an array of political, historical and irrational factors.

My Life in France - Part #1

I recently arrived to a French-Italian border city in the South of France (Provence) on the Mediterranean Sea. This is where I will be beginning and living the next 5 months of my life. It's not a shabby-looking place at all - in fact it's beautiful, albeit quite a bit colder than expected. I think that things will work out well for me here. After all, even if they don't, it's just 5 small months.

Since I am an exchange student here, my workload is very small. Moreover, since I will be experiencing so many new things, it would make sense for me to get back to blogging to document them. I think that my life in Vancouver bored me out and that is why the blogging stopped - things weren't special anymore. But, everything here is new and special and therefore worth mentioning. I have decided to dedicate a lot of this blog's next half a year -in fact, probably all of it- to describing and explaining my time here. Before I begin, a thanks to Nima for actually encouraging this and reminding me of my duty to entertain the small masses that read my blog with the trials and tribulations of my existence.

I would explain my reasons for being on exchange first, but that would take up a great many paragraphs and no one would want to bother themselves with that pathetic-ness, so let's skip that and go straight into the physical departure:

I embarked on my journey from Vancouver with my mom, who I had hoped would be helpful in bypassing the obviously nasty French bureaucracy. I wanted her to help get me settled in my first life alone, and all that other stuff that one would want their mother there for. We planned to spend 3 days in Paris first before heading down to Menton, and so we did.

Paris was not enjoyed by me. First of all, I was jet-lagged. Second, I was sad to have left my friends and family behind. Third, Paris is not a nice place. It's dirty, overrated, arrogant and not so special. I will say that Paris does offer one good thing and that is a motorized scooter service, which one can use to travel from place to place. It is the most fun and handy thing I have ever seen. I rode around the city on my scooter for a long time and it was extremely pleasant. The food in Paris was also nothing to write home about, and therefore I won't be writing out loud about it.

After 3 days of my mother's elation, we made our way down to Nice. Here, we spent about a week together. My mom was very chatty and remarkably happy the entire time, and it made me feel almost as though she was rubbing in how shitty I felt. I know that she wasn't, but I couldn't help feeling that way. I deeply missed my cat, and things we're not going well for me at all. I was sensing a deep coming dread.

On that note, let me explain what has been happening with me for about the past 6 months. I have been experiencing radical emotions. When I am happy, I am euphoric; when I am sad, I am terribly sad. The same principle has applied to my relations with other people - when I like someone, I love them; when I don't, I hate them. The emotions have been fast and strong, and I have felt completely taken by them. It is unfortunate because I am generally such a rational person, who thinks things through, sometimes even too much. No longer do I think anything through - I just go with what I feel. I hope that this will change and that things will go back to normal soon. Frankly, I don't know if it is possible to live life like this. To put things simply: I have been living off vibes for the past six months.

Do you know what that's like for me?

I have been in love 20 times. I have fallen out of love just as many. There is no stability in that.

My emotional rollercoaster has followed me since the start of last semester. It started with smaller things, but gradually progressed to bigger ones. The first thing that comes to mind is the friendship that I started with a guy I met in my Italian class over cookies. I had made cookies for my class as part of a presentation. These cookies were tasted by the class and received generally positive reviews. A Greek guy who I barely knew up until then commented on my cookies after I finished my presentation to say that they were amazing. Not just ok, or good, or fine, but amazing. His eyes were wide as he told me about them and he looked remarkably genuine. Many people told me that they were solid cookies, but none sparked the same endearing honesty that I felt radiating from him. It was childlike. That, paired with the fact that he had a typically pleasant Greek face, sparked a immense feeling of joy in me.

I spoke with him after class and realized that he had been living off of chicken nuggets for the past few months since coming to university, so that explained why even my mediocre cookies inspired him so much, but that's beside the point. As I spoke to him, I felt a huge degree of genuine happiness come from within him. It felt so good to walk with someone so happy. We spoke and got on really well, and fairly quickly I was deeply taken by him. Before you get the wrong idea: no, not at all romantically. It's a feeling that I can't even explain. I felt a culmination of many different types of love and admiration for him. I wished all good things to come his way. I can't explain it in words.

A Response to Milan Kundera's "The Tragedy of Central Europe"

Personally, I was not a fan of Kundera’s essay. He certainly raises a few good points, and his prose is wonderful, but I largely consider his stance to be a toxic one that chronically plagues hoards of people within the region he speaks of. In fact, I think that his view, especially if taken at face value, ends up holding Slavic (or Central, or whatever you prefer referring to it as) Europe back from potential prosperity. I’ll just say that my major question with regard to Kundera’s essay is if he understood the implications of his thoughts and moreover, if he was completely clear on the potential pitfalls that his preaching could’ve created? I feel like maybe Kundera chose to ignore some other historical events to better his argument. Furthermore, I wonder what events led to Kundera having this view on Central Europe?

First, let me provide an analogy of what I feel Kundera's essay advocates for Central Europe's global behavior: A new kid comes to school (any Central European Kundera mentions). There, he finds two popular groups (Western Europe and Russia). The new kid decides to join the Western group. When he tugs at their sleeves and asks if he can be their friend, the group tells him to give them a moment to discuss. The kids who make up Western Europe decide that they don’t like the clothes the new kid is wearing, have no idea what he might be like and just generally consider him to be inferior. Nonetheless, they decide to tell the new kid that he can indeed be their friend. They then proceed to list out the things that their new friend must do for them. These include: get them coffee each morning before class, start to dress differently, use their slang, and offer up their house to them anytime they want to throw a party. The new kid is so desperate to join them that he agrees and is essentially willfully enslaved by the popular kids. 

This is what I think Kundera fails to recognize. Slavic people (and I know that Kundera rejects the blanketing of all Slavs as having the same complexes and mentalities, but he’s not reading this, so who cares?) generally have an inferiority complex when it comes to Westerners. Despite all of their achievements, they choose to view themselves under the narrative that the West has given them (i.e. some pagan primitives from nowhere who are good for nothing except cheap exploitation). Slavs are obviously much more than this (Tesla gave us AC, some of the best writers in the world have come from here, and so on), but they seem to lean increasingly towards fulfilling the narrative they are labelled with. This is unfortunate.

Slavs seem to consider the only things that they can offer to be the things that those in the West desire, but this is flawed. Slavs can offer much more than just what the West wants. They offer a completely different take on life and a radically different sense of humour, amongst other things. Though these things are sometimes not particularly valued by the West, they are intrinsically valuable. Arguably, they’re more valuable than the values that Westernization promotes. 

Rambling aside, Kundera seems to miss the fact that there is little difference in the enslavement of Central Europe by the Russians and the enslavement presented by the Western powers.  The only difference, I would say, is that the Russians are more honest and efficient. They swoop into a country and say “now you’re ours and this is what you must do”. The Westerns, though, do this as well, just in a clandestine way (i.e. by offering incentives and marketing better). 

I’ll try to keep this as brief as I possibly can, but at this point, I’m sure no one is reading this, so maybe I won’t. 

First, I’ll mention a few things I agree with that Kundera says, and then I’ll bring up and refute a number of Kundera’s other points: 

Agreement: When Kundera says “…[Central Europe] never been entirely integrated into the consciousness of Europe.” I agree with him. For a number of reasons, Central Europe has remained a part of the Earth that no one seems to care for or want to have genuine, non-exploitative relations with. Likewise, Kundera’s entire little tangent about the Jews in Central Europe being integral is easy to acknowledge and agree with. 

“The people of Central Europe are not conquerors. They cannot be separated from European history; they cannot exist outside it; but they represent the wrong side of this history; they are its victims and outsiders.” Is another quote I agree with Kundera on wholly. Historically, Central Europeans have never been imperialists, rather chronic victims of it, amongst other things. 

Finally, Kundera’s final phrase is a good reflection of how I feel about the entirety of the essay. Some of it is clever, the rest is ill-informed. “Central Europe, therefore, should fight not only against its big oppressive neighbour but also against the subtle, relentless pressure of time, which is leaving the era of culture in its wake.” Yes, Central Europe should fight against everyone trying to occupy it. But, it really shouldn’t fight this culture-disintegration. That is an inevitable and ever-changing aspect of the world and all societies and it needs to be embraced as effectively as possible. 

Now for the refutation:

Firstly, he says that “…Russia is not part of our consciousness; it's foreign to us; we're not responsible for it. It weighs on us, but it's not our heritage…” (pp. 5). Wrong, Milan, wrong indeed. I don’t know if it’s just the fact that Kundera fails to realize the essence of Central Europe and what makes it so important, or if he just accidentally omits this because it doesn’t work with his argument. The fact is that Central and Slavic Europe is largely so special because of the hodge-podge of cultures that have left their marks on it. Yes, this includes the West that occupied, as well as the Ottomans, as well as the Romans and, unfortunately for Kundera, the Russians, as well. Like it or not, they nonetheless are a part of the collective consciousness and heritage of the region. I think it would be very hard to argue otherwise. 

Secondly, also on page 5, Kundera says “… the deep meaning of [the Central European's] resistance is the struggle to preserve their identity or, to put it another way, to preserve their Westernness.” Really? You’d think that nations that collectively fought so hard to not be satellite states of various empires would want to preserve something bigger than Westernness. You’d think they’d want to preserve their own integrity. When the Hungarians tried overthrowing in 1956, I doubt they did it because they felt Western or any other way, I really think they did it because they just wanted to be free and govern themselves. Likewise, when Princip shot Ferdinand, I highly doubt he did it because he wanted revert to some “better” oppressor, like the Turks (not that they were better), he probably just wanted some freedom and sovereignty for his own special nation.  

Thirdly, I think that it is very well a sin in the “Being-a-Slav” handbook to suggest that the dissolution of Austria-Hungary was a bad thing in the long run. Perhaps Kundera would have enjoyed living on his knees and being subject to infringements on him, on his own turf, in his own ancestral land. We differ there, because I would not have. I would rather have sovereignty and the ability to do as I -and my fellow countryman- please, instead of bowing my head obediently to some big bully just so that he protects me from another big bully. 

Fourthly, I would argue that a “Slavic Spirit” does indeed exist. It may not be as rigid and general as Polish Josef Conrad implies it to be on page 6, but there certainly are commonalities shared amongst Slavs.

Fifthly, I disagree with Kundera when he says “I think I know only that culture has bowed out.” (pp. 11). No, culture never bows out. It takes different forms, this is true, but it never just disappears. Culture is far too complex for this. I imagine that when Kundera was writing this, he was a bit conceited and snobbish (the adjective I sought to use was from the Serbian “pokondiren”, but there is not an adequate match in English, so I chose those two). He probably considered the only “true” culture to be plays and serious books and classical music. This is really not true. So much culture exists beyond this box, and media is just one example (which Kundera seems to be unimpressed with on page 13 when speaking with his French, TV-watching friends).

Speaking of which, there is proof from Kundera himself on the treatment of Western Europe to the Central states! The Central-European-er goes up to the Westerners and says “You won’t believe it! Culture just got wiped out where I live and I’m telling you this because I know how much you will sympathize, unlike those savage Russians, and how much you value culture!” The Westerner replies back “Wow, you are so passé! Lame!”

That is the real tragedy of Slavic, Central Europe.

Corruption in Israel and Benjamin Netanyahu

It's been quite a while since I have last posted. I know, I'm pathetic. What's more? This post is not even written for this blog - it's written for my class. I'm just making use of it to try to mask how pathetic I am. But hey, Mid-December is my winter break. I do sincerely plan on writing one very good story here and posting it then. Until then, enjoy reading this paper I wrote on the state of corruption in Israel for my Politics class.

The eyes of the world have yet again shifted to the Middle East. This time it is for corruption scandals. Israeli Prime Minister (PM), Benjamin “Bibi” Netanyahu is under police investigation and public scrutiny for the third time during his reign as Israel’s most important political figure. Bribery, breach of trust, and fraud are all crimes for which he is currently under investigation for, and which plague his reputation this time. Niccolo Machiavelli is probably celebrating the decent use of his old guide to ruling The Prince, while Plato is likely turning in his grave at the clear injustice posed by Netanyahu, as per The Republic. This essay will aim to cover Netanyahu’s scandal through the lenses of two starkly different political theorists, by explaining their theories, and demonstrating how Netanyahu has not precisely fulfilled the criteria of being a good leader by either, but has exposed the fallacies and truths in both of their cases.

The PM has been questioned by police more than five times in the past month, though he has publicly denounced all charges as “fake news” (The Jerusalem Post, 2017). Having survived the previous scandals, Netanyahu seems quite certain that he can, survive the current issues as well. However, this seems less likely because of events that have taken place during this investigation, which undermine his innocence, that did not occur during previous ones.

Most notable is the recent departure of his Chief of Staff, Ari Harrow. Following two years of investigation, which culminated with police forces suggesting Harrow be indicted for bribery, money laundering, fraud and breach of trust, Harrow settled on a deal with State prosecutors. In exchange for testifying against Netanyahu in two corruption-related cases, prosecutors would give Harrow the lighter sentence (Reuters, 2017).

When news of this plea deal surfaced, Netanyahu’s innocence and prospects both became understandably bleaker in the eyes of the public. His Chief of Staff was all but openly admitting to the charges, and he was moreover admitting to knowing of Netanyahu’s wrongdoings. Nonetheless, Netanyahu, who stands to become Israel’s longest-serving PM if he can last the whole of his current term in office, has fervently deemed the charges to be part of a political “witch-hunt” (The Jerusalem Post, 2017). Netanyahu even went so far as to say, in Donald Trump-esque fashion, “We know that the left and the media — and we know that it’s the same thing — is on an unprecedented hunt against me and my family to bring down the government...” (The Jerusalem Post, 2017)

Netanyahu’s major accusations lie in Case 1000 and Case 2000. Case 1000 deals with Netanyahu accepting gifts from various businessmen. As per Israeli law, the PM can accept gifts from friends so long as he not then use political channels to repay the gifts, as this would constitute bribery and breach of trust. It is claimed that Netanyahu met with billionaire film producer Arnon Milchan, who gave Netanyahu and his wife, Sara (also implicated in the charges), enormous quantities of wine and cigars, in exchange for Netanyahu’s help and lobbying in getting a United States visa (Vox, 2017).

Case 2000 regards the possible collusion between the PM and the publisher of a major Israeli newspaper. According to reports, Netanyahu met with Arnon Mozes. Mozes pledged that he would ensure his paper would publish pro-Netanyahu content and help keep the PM in power, if Netanyahu took measures, such as introducing legislation, to ensure that Mozes’s main newspaper competition would be kept at bay (Vox, 2017).

With all these allegations swirling, and public approval ratings dropping, it seems unlikely that Netanyahu will manage to survive police prodding for a third time (The New Republic, 2017). At least he will not be alone in being an Israeli PM with a less than spotless record. He will join Ehud Olmert, his former political rival and past Prime Minister, in serving jail time for corruption related charges. After this, the people of Israel can only hope that they will have better luck next election.

When examining Netanyahu’s case from the lenses of two of the most famous political theorists to have ever been, Niccolo Machiavelli and Plato, two very different views are provided for why Netanyahu has behaved as he has, how he has previously gotten away with it, what can be done to remedy the damage that has built up, and what the future holds for Israeli politics.

Machiavelli and Plato write in very different styles, but their differences do not end there. The two writers also have starkly different opinions on what a ruler’s function is, how a ruler should approach his job and society, and even what a ruler should be.

According to Plato in his political book The Republic, the ideal city effectively consists of three types of people – those with bronze in their souls, those with silver, and those with gold. Though Plato is aware that this concept is a lie, he justifies it being told for the promotion of the greater good. The bronze people are the commoners, the silver are the auxiliaries of the Guardian class, and the gold are those who are most fit to rule. In this category of gold souls is The Philosopher King (PK).

The PK is a Guardian of the city who exceeds all expectations and can thus be promoted to Head of State. According to Plato, the PK must be incredibly smart, and use logic and philosophy as his basis to ruling. He also must be satisfied with very little material wealth because material wealth corrupts. Moreover, the philosopher king must be just and love wisdom. What separates the PK from others is that he has true knowledge by being the only person in the ideal city with access to the ideal forms, as opposed to simply being well-educated by schools and so forth. Philosophers, though occasionally looked down on in Athenian society, are defended by Plato and declared to be the most fit to rule, especially because they have no intention to rule.

For Plato, the PK needs to be the person who has access to the ideal forms because they will help him make positive decisions for the future of the city, they need to not have will to rule because only people who are not power-hungry can be trusted with power, and they need to have minimal material wealth because that will prevent them from becoming corrupted. Morally, the PK values the acquisition of knowledge above all else, and thus intellectually, he can achieve understanding of the ideal forms, particularly those of virtue, beauty and good. This, of course, goes along with that person being very smart, physically fit, and otherwise virtuous.

Niccolò Machiavelli has a more brutal and pragmatic approach than his counterpart Plato. Before that approach is discussed, it is necessary to note that Machiavelli wrote his famous political guide The Prince as a work intended for monarchs, as opposed to democratically-elected officials in republic nation-states. However, the content of The Prince offers enough political insight and opinion that it can easily be applied to democratically-elected officials and their own methods of ruling, too. Obviously, since Israel is a republic with regular elections, Machiavelli’s work will be used to describe Netanyahu’s time and dealings as PM.

Machiavelli uses very clear and systematic writing in The Prince. This comes with certain shortfalls. The most pertinent of these is that if any part of his chain of reasoning is flawed, the entire argument is invalid. Despite this, Machiavelli makes many arguments that are solid and even relevant in modern-politics, including those of Israel.

Machiavelli’s core difference from Plato is his opinion on society in general. He states that men are intrinsically “ungrateful, fickle, dissembling, anxious to flee danger, and covetous of gain.” He also proclaims that most subjects are “used to obeying” and they have trouble living when an authoritative figure is not telling them what to do. Men are inclined to follow tradition and feel comfortable when they are partaking in the “old ways of life”. These statements make it clear that Machiavelli considers people to be proverbial “sheep” and blindly follow their leaders. This is in stark contrast to Plato who believes that men like to be involved in daily politics and political biddings. For Machiavelli, even the almighty Prince himself is a follower. The Prince imitates the examples of previous successful leaders in attempts to be successful himself.

Plato is not the only one who would disagree with Machiavelli’s description of the populace. Aristotle, a prominent political theorist in his own right, declared man to be a “political animal”. He concluded humans are quite interested in politics and the welfare of their whole society. Being a political naturalist, Aristotle believed that politics is not just something that men invented and implemented, it is something that is intangible, yet intrinsically existent in human society. Men participate in it because it is almost instinctual to them.

Machiavelli would disagree. He thinks of humans as much more stupid. People either hate or love a prince, and that depends on if that prince harms or benefits them and their way of life. So, Machiavelli’s view on how a Prince should behave consists of many recommendations, though none of them really involve progressive, populace-based decision-making.

This autocratic idea can be discredited through historical examples, such as that of Christian VII of Denmark-Norway. Though he was mentally-insane, sweeping progressive reforms were introduced under his reign. Despite these being the actual doings of his wife and his physician, Christian was lauded by his people, who supported him ever-more strongly after the reforms (Struensee, 1772).

According to The Prince, a monarch can exercise cruelty, if that cruelty occurs all at once, because the people will forget about it in a relatively short span of time. Therefore, a prince does not need to be virtuous, he only needs to appear virtuous in the eyes of the public. But what does it mean to be virtuous, according to Machiavelli? It simply means doing things that are lauded by citizens. This is unlike Aristotle and Plato, who see virtuosity as being an abstract notion in relation to some utmost good and do not consider the practical consequences of it. In Machiavelli’s mind, ethics do not seem important, and only feasible results count when it comes to politics.  So in the end, it does not matter how a prince treats his people, or the way he himself is, if he maintains power, and this can be done through keeping the people minimally content.

For Machiavelli, a perfect prince is not someone who governs with aspects of philosophy, art and political theory, he is simply someone who focuses on military strength and public image. He should harm people only if he is certain that there will be no revenge, and should revolts happen, he should crush them and punish the rebels – these things can boost his image. Ideally, however, a prince should foresee issues and attempt to solve them before they get out of hand.

Good princes rely on intelligence and cunning prowess to obtain power (if they do not get it through hereditary means). They must continue the same pattern after they gain power. If contentious issues arise, the prince should “force the issues” through. It can be interpreted that in some cases that means using literal physical force. Some democratically-elected leaders have used force to pass legislation before. Donald Trump is one of these. During the first week of his presidency, Trump passed several Executive Orders. These orders bypass conventional methods of government in the sense that they do not need to be approved by Congress. Rather, these orders are granted to the President of the United States as a form of “discretionary power” (CNN, 2017).

Benjamin Netanyahu does not seem to fit the criteria of any exact theorist, though he certainly leans more towards Machiavelli’s ideology. That being said, the theories of these two political minds can always be skewed for personal benefit. Ayatollah Khomeini, former spiritual and political leader of Iran is thought to have based his rise and rule on Plato’s model of the PK (Biography.com, n.d.). Still, Khomeini did many things during his reign which would make it impossible for Plato to accept him as a PK.

Netanyahu generally rules with disregard for the means, as long as they reach a desired end. This can be seen by the state of the settlements on the West Bank. He also does his best to maintain a positive image, as can be seen by Case 2000, and he supresses political turmoil, as he did in his last two corruption investigations. Nonetheless, he continues to exercise a form of cruelty on his people by breaching their trust and being corrupt. Though Machiavelli would disapprove of this prolonged and constant cruelty of Netanyahu, he would accept it when he would learn about how Netanyahu works hard to maintain a positive political image and a veil of virtuosity, regardless of how dubious his channels for doing so are.

Machiavelli seems to have channelled many of Sun Tzu’s ideas from Art of War when it comes to his own ideas about military strength. (*see reference) However, Netanyahu would appear to have disproven Machiavelli’s ideas through his actions. Machiavelli says, “the presence of sound military forces indicates the presence of sound laws”. Despite having one of the most impressive military forces in the Middle East, Israel’s laws chronically fail the people when it comes to efficiently deposing corrupt leaders.

But Netanyahu does do Machiavelli some justice with the fact that he is Israel’s first Israeli-born PM. Seeing that he has managed to hold onto power for so long despite the scandals could be a result of him being raised in the same culture and speaking the same language as the people he now governs. Machiavelli does not understate the importance of being familiar with the culture and language of your kingdom.

Netanyahu has done good things for his people during his time in office as well. He has introduced economic reforms, which are well-liked by the people, and he has served as Israel’s first “presentable” PM – meaning that he wears a suit and blends in well with the rest of the world’s diplomats (Vox, 2015).

Plato would be horrified by Netanyahu playing in arguably the most pivotal role in the Middle East. Netanyahu has shown no philosophical knowledge of the ideal forms, and he is not just. His greed demonstrates that, though he may be conventionally well-educated, he lacks “true knowledge”. Most importantly, Netanyahu’s scandal demonstrates that material wealth corrupts, as Plato had stated. Karl Marx would agree with Plato here and probably use Netanyahu as an example of a Bourgeoisie – someone who is so enamored by the prospect of wealth, that they stop at nothing, no matter how vile, to acquire it (Marx, 1848).

In Marx’s opinion, as per The Communist Manifesto, the average people of Israel should rise and overthrow this obviously corrupted government, though it is unlikely that that will actually happen. In Plato’s opinion, Netanyahu should also leave and go fulfill a role more suited to his non-gold soul. He should relieve himself of his material wealth and seek to access the highest form of knowledge. In Machiavelli’s opinion, Netanyahu should continue as he is. Though Netanyahu is breaking a few of Machiavelli’s rules, he is doing so with the purpose of achieving the same desired end – the perpetuation of his rule.

As a student in the famed class Poli240 at UBC, and as a budding political figure, I believe that Machiavelli provides the most pragmatic and likely way to govern for Netanyahu, and for many other current politicians. As much as I adore Marx, I am doubtful that his ideal form of government will ever effectively exist. This is because I believe Plato when he says that wealth and material possessions corrupt – people naturally always want more. This is makes it very difficult for true communism to ever come to fruition. Likewise, Plato’s hippy-commune-style fantasy world is hard to implement. Citizens of Western Liberal Democracies have become accustomed to having money to spend on materialistic trinkets, and have an engrained notion that their quality of life and their worth as a person is equal to the sum of the value of their material possessions. This is an extremely difficult thought-cycle to break, and makes it unlikely for Plato’s Kallipolis to ever be.

I would like to see the world move through the necessary motions to achieve a peaceful coexistence, where people are content with more intangible things, like love and humor. Unfortunately, such a transition is very hard to incentivize because of the way that Westerners (and I am including Israelis in that) have viewed, and continue to view, the world.

The major differences between Plato and Machiavelli’s ideologies lie in their opinions on men’s nature, and the purpose of government. The purpose of Machiavelli’s guide to governance is, unlike Plato’s, not to create a perfect society where every citizen is content and presented with equal opportunities, rather Machiavelli is solely concerned with what actions need to happen to perpetuate a monarch’s control over his territory. Netanyahu embodies the theories of Machiavelli far more than he does those of Plato, or any other mentioned philosopher. He simply does what he sees to be the easiest way to achieve his desired ends. He is not just, he is corrupted by material wealth and thirst for power, and that is why he would make Plato upset.

The people of Israel can only hope for a better future, if they manage to depose Netanyahu. Considering their history, the prospects are bleak.

  

Works Cited

Aristotle. Politics. Harvard University Press, 2005.

Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini - Religious Figure - Biography.com. (n.d.). Retrieved 11 24, 2017, from Biography.com: http://www.biography.com/people/ayatollah-ruhollah-khomeini-13680544

Birnbaum, B. (n.d.). Benjamin Netanyahu Will Not Win Another Election. Retrieved 11 24, 2017, from https://newrepublic.com/article/121320/benjamin-netanyahu-wins-israel-election-5-takeaways

CNN, J. D. (n.d.). Trump's latest executive order: Banning people from 7 ... Retrieved 11 24, 2017, from ''CNN'': http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/27/politics/donald-trump-refugees-executive-order/index.html

Griffith, S. (2005). Sun Tzu: The Illustrated Art of War. Oxford University Press. Retrieved 11 24, 2017

Machiavelli, Niccolo. The Prince. Cambridge Press, 1975.

Marx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels. The Communist Manifesto. Monthly Review Press, 1998.

Plato.  Republic. Oxford University Press, 1998.

Schioldann, J. (2013). ‘Struensée’s memoir on the situation of the King’ (1772): Christian VII of Denmark. History of Psychiatry, 24(2), 227-247. Retrieved 11 24, 2017, from https://ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/24573261

Wildman, Sarah. “A Corruption Investigation Could Bring down Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.” Vox, Vox, 8 Aug. 2017, www.vox.com/world/2017/8/8/16107212/corruption-bribery-netanyahu-chief-of-staff-revelations.